1st International Conference on Sustainable Lighting and Light Pollution, SLLP 2014

The first issue to address is why artificial light at night, with its clear advantages to business, safety and security = as well as public amenity should be subject to any regulation at all.

2. Human Health

Artificial light at night may harm human health. It may disturb sleep by shining into bedroom windows, and it is well settled under English law that the courts accept that sleeplessness can harm health [1][2]. However emerging medical research indicates more serious negative effects.[3] Indoor lighting may increase the risk = of certain forms of cancer in humans (e.g. breast and colo-rectal), because li= ght at night can alter the brain’s biochemistry by the inhibiting production of Melatonin, (an antioxidant that protects the body from certain cancers) [2-= 5][4]. Melatonin is produced at night, but only if it is dark. This research has l= ed the World Health Organisation (WHO) along with the American Medical Associa= tion (AMA) and European Commission [6-11][5], to issue a call for more research.

Studies show that it is daylight type (blue rich) lighting which suppresses Melaton= in the most [12-13][6]. Marketed due to energy efficiency, the most efficient types of LED emit the most heavily in the blue. A missing part of the equation is the exact level= and duration of exposure required to constitute an unacceptable risk to human health. Or whether exterior lighting represents any risk at all. However ma= ny local authorities are installing blue rich LED street lighting, due to the financial savings that these LEDs are said to offer. These may shine into bedroom windows. Even so, it is submitted that sleep disturbance, which is quite well settled legally, justifies regulation in its own right.

3. Ecological Health, Safety, Energy Waste and the Loss of the Night Sky

There are similar problems posed to ecological health, and these along with the loss of the night sky have been addressed elsewhere [14-15][7]<= ![endif]>. To summarise, there may be similar effects to caused ecological health; the view of the night time sky is being blocked out by artificial light, and wa= sted light is wasted energy, carbon emissions and money. However the problems ca= used by glare, and nuisances in the form of the loss of sleep, or the general lo= ss of quality of life will be discussed here.

4. Glare

Artificial lighting may harm safety either direc= tly via disability glare or by distraction. Disability glare may occur for exam= ple, where a badly angled security light shines into the eyes of motorists maski= ng objects or people. This may result in accidents caused by the lighting. Such glare may also result from security lighting angled outwards and into the e= yes of potential onlookers, rather than downwards illuminating the criminal. Su= ch security lighting is said to be beneficial because it allows opportunities = for passive surveillance, in that it may permit passers-by to see criminal acti= vity and report it. However the glare caused by angling the light outwards destr= oys the opportunity for passive surveillance, by shining the light into the eye= s of the passers-by masking the criminal from sight. The result is that lighting that is put up for safety and security can actually have the opposite effec= t, and can also result in other problems to sleep and quality of life generally.

Clearly these forms of lighting, which have often been put up to serve safety and security may harm both interests. As such regulation may serve a positive role in ensuring that lighting is fitted correctly so as to serve its’ intended purpose. Distraction may occur, for example, where a motorists’ attention is diverted away from the road by illuminated advertising. The balance here is claim for a commercial need for illuminated advertising, set against the claim for accident risks.

5. Nuisance (Light “Trespass= ”)

Artificial light at night can also cause broad problems that relate to an interference with the quality of life that are not direct= ly related to health. These problems may come from unwanted spill light shining into a bedroom window disturbing sleep, glare from light shining into eyes,= or general complaints about an unpleasant atmosphere caused by lighting.<= /o:p>

These problems are often referred to as “light trespa= ss”. However trespass has a legal meaning and the effects caused by artificial l= ight have not been held to constitute trespass in many jurisdictions law, (inclu= ding England and the USA). As such the use of this expression might be a source = of confusion for regulators.

There is however case law concerning light nuisance in some common law jurisdictions, such as the UK and USA [16][8]. However lighting must meet certain criteria to constitute a nuisance in law. The challenges for lighting in meeting these criteria will be addressed lat= er in the section reviewing the “bolt on” approach to regulation in England.= In addition to common law nuisance, where an individual can take the owner of a light to court to get the light nuisance abated (reduced or stopped), Engla= nd has recently added artificial lighting to the list of possible “statutory” nuisances in recognition of some of these problems [17] [9]. (These concepts will also be addressed later.)

A study carried out for the UK Defra (Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs) [18][10] reviewed the sources of general nuisance complaints from lighting to local authorities. Domestic security lighting was by far the largest in the “domestic” sub-category (1760 of 2475 complaints) [18][11]. These lights are commonly fitted angled outwards, creating the glare that m= ay be dangerous to road users, or spill light into windows or the sky as set o= ut above.

The study also sub-categorised other locations of nuis= ance lighting complaints to local authorities. Of the 180 documented nuisance co= mplaints from “sports” facilities, 68 were from football or hockey pitches, 33 from tennis courts, 33 from golf driving ranges, with 11 from rugby pitches. Of = the 384 complaints from the “industrial” sub-category, the vast majority (209= ) were from factory security lighting, the second highest (34) were from car parks. Of the 796 complaints = from “commercial” lighting, shop security lighting was top (131), shop adverti= sing second (95), then office security lighting (66) and car parks (60) [18][12].

There is a similar nuisance problem in Korea, with the following numbers of complaints to the Seoul City authorities (population t= en million) [19][13] :

Table 1. Numbers of compla= ints to the Seoul City authorities (population ten million).

Year

Sleep<= o:p>

Life

General glare

Other<= o:p>

Total<= o:p>

2015

1043

73=

59

2<= /p>

1177

2014

1424

136

-

11

1571

2013

547

186

-

40

773

These problems highlight the need for an effective con= trol of the broad types of nuisances that are commonly the subject to complaint.=

6. Legal Regulation of Light = at Night

Now that the broad problems justifying the regulation = of artificial light at night have been set out, we may now consider the possib= le mechanisms for legal control[14]. These mechanisms must be able to address these key problems, whilst at the = same time protecting the benefits that artificial light at night may offer. So regulation must be a balanced response to the problems that does not harm commercial interests or social utility where possible. There are several possible forms that this regulation may take. It may firstly come from hard binding law. For example it may come from sector specific laws such as plan= ning regulation, building regulations, nuisance, public health or environmental laws. It may come in the form of dedicated legislation aiming to address al= l or some of the problems set out above. Or it may come from bolting it on to pre-existing legislation such as planning or nuisance laws. Regulation may = also come from soft law, in the form of non-binding guidance, written by governm= ent, the lighting industry, and/ or environmental stakeholders such as the International Commission on Illumination (CIE) [20][15], or from ecological certification organisations such as the UK’s Buildings Research establishment (BRE) [21][16]. Guidance can help educate, so as to increase the levels of understanding of= the underlying purpose of the regulation. Such understanding should increase compliance and reduce the need for conflict (and cost), in the form of enforcement.

Regulation may include subjective nuisance based conce= pts that are to be interpreted by local authorities. Or it may include a metrics based system with limits, curfews, or a mixture of these. Metrics may be us= ed to provide either guidance or hard limits as to the levels of light, (or the types of light) that may be permitted. Metrics may also come from a variety= of sources, including the lighting industry, national governments or internati= onal standards organisations such as the CIE.&n= bsp; They may be based on experimental data or the judgment of experts in study groups. Or they may be based on what is achievable commercially given= the impact of regulation on manufacturers and retailers.

Bolting onto existing legislation, offers a quick and cheap way to regulate, by avoiding the time and expense of generating new legislation. However this is at the expense of coverage; it will only cover those aspects of light at night within the scope of the pre-existing laws involved. (England’s planning and statutory nuisance regimes are good exam= ples of this approach.) Dedicated provisions, formulated specifically to address= the negative effects of artificial light at night may be more effective. Unlike bolt on provisions, they have the potential to address all of the environme= ntal and human health problems. The Korean dedicated provisions that will be discussed below, serve as a good example for balancing the competing interests between the advantages and disadvantages of lighting. Such legislation comes from a very good understanding of the problem, and it may be less vulnerable to calls for repeal.

Regulation may benefit from the input and support of stakeholder groups, such as the lighting industry and environmental groups. However, it is accept= ed that agreement here may be limited because it may be difficult to reconcile= the different objectives of each group. Although this gives some control and ownership to these stake holder groups. Soft law input in the form of guida= nce may assist hard law, in providing clear detail as to what is and is not acceptable, and it may offer alternatives. Any agreement between the lighti= ng industry, business groups and environmentalists would be constructive and s= uch agreement would also reduce possible challenges to the regulation.

All of these types of regulation may be applied on a l= ocal or regional level via a local authority, a whole nation, or to a number of nations in a trade bloc, such as the European Union.

There is national legislation in a growing number of countries. For example, individual states in the USA [22][17], The Republic of Korea [24] [18], France[19], Slovenia[20], England [= 25][21] and many Italian regions[22]. England and Korea will be used as exemplars because they cover significantly different approaches. England has a bolt on system that does not use binding metrics, whilst the Korean system is a bespoke law that uses metrics. Both countries also cover a wide geographical area as well as different legal traditions.

7. England (Bolt On)

Unlike Korea, regulation in England uses the bolt on approach, incorporating light at night into existing hard law concerning planning and nuisance, rather than by the use of dedicated legislation. Thi= s is supplemented by a number of guidance notes from central government and the lighting industry, working with stakeholders such as environmental bodies. =

Light pollution is a factor for consideration at the planning stage for new buildings in England [26][23]. However, this bolt on approach has weaknesses. For example, English planning law limits consideration on existing buildings to cases where there is “development”, that is an impact on the daytime visual appearance of prem= ises [24]. This is because the planning system is more interested in the appearance of= the light fittings, rather than the problems actually caused by the light fitti= ngs. Yet night-time floodlighting is a key cause of problems with artificial lig= ht at night. LED lighting generally emits light from smaller, more compact lig= ht sources than traditional lighting. So, floor mounted upwardly pointing LED floodlighting may be less likely to be viewed as a ‘development’ attracti= ng planning control, because it is less prominent during daytime hours. Howeve= r, the effects of the light may be just as great.

Until the British Government recently published a guid= ance note on light pollution and planning [27][25], there had been no clear practical guidance on what exactly developers were = or were not allowed to do. This led to regulatory conflict with a lack of tran= sparency for lighting designers, users and consumers, and an inconsistent response f= rom local authorities. Indeed it has been an occasional practice in England for planning committees to accept without question assurances that “we are usi= ng modern LED lighting, so there will be no light pollution”.

Supplementary (soft law) guidance from the lighting industry and other environmental interest groups can also have a significant role to play in bolt on regulation. The United Kingdom’s Institute of Ligh= ting Professionals (ILP) provides Guidance Notes for the Reduction of Obtrusive Light [28][26], which off= er clear guidance on avoiding over-lighting, and provides diagrams on how to f= it light fittings correctly. The guidance is drafted with input from several e= nvironmental stakeholders, and is well respected in the United Kingdom.

English statutory nuisance serves as another example of bolt on legislation. However, the most fundamental problem with bolting lig= ht pollution onto existing nuisance legislation is that artificial light at ni= ght causes problems far wider than the narrowly defined criteria that trigger t= he nuisance regime; that is the effects on everyday enjoyment of property interests, rather than broader environmental and ecological concerns noted earlier[27]. Many of the complaints addressed a= bove may come into a much wider category of “nuisance” that falls outside of t= he legal definition.

Artificial light at night was recently added to the li= st of potential statutory nuisances under the Environmental Protection Act 199= 0. So that it covers ‘‘artificial light emitted from premises so as to be prejudicial to health or a nuisance’’[28]. Local authority environmental health services are obliged to investigate complaints made by members of the public. However, this has the same proble= m of scope of coverage. S.80 EPA empowers the local authority to assess whether = the artificial lighting breaches either or both of the two statutory nuisance limbs. That is, whether it is prejudicial to health, a nuisance, or both. T= he standard required by the health limb is an objective one and set at a higher standard than the second nuisance limb. In Birmingham CC v Oakley[29] prejudice to health covers “… what may be actually injurious as well as w= hat may be likely to be injurious and (is) in either case something over and ab= ove what may be seen as a “nuisance”.

It requires credible scientific evidence that, on bala= nce of probabilities, artificial lighting is harmful to health, or that exposur= e to it represents a significant risk. Whilst it is expected that sleep disturba= nce is recognised as a possible consequence, the other negative effects on human health (such as cancer), probably presently fall short of this evidential hurdle.

The second (nuisance) limb offers more of an opportuni= ty for coverage of light at night. This element deals with the interference of personal comfort that is not directly linked with human health [29-31][30]. This second (nuisance) limb includes public as well as private forms of nuisance. The requirement for private nuisance requires that the lighting m= ust be emitted from premises and have an affect on other premises. The lighting must also unreasonably interfere, in a material or substantial way, with the victim's use of their property. The nuisance limb also requires interferenc= e to a person's “personal comfort” [29][31]. This is assessed objectively, and it will not apply to what a hypersensitive victim regards as interference in their personal comfort if a person of ave= rage sensitivities would not regard it as such. There is existing case law where= the broadly equivalent criteria for private nuisance have been accepted by the courts under statutory nuisance, where car park [32][32] or sports facility lighting [33][33] has shone into windows, or disturbed night fishing [34][34]. However the energy waste or harm to ecological health that can be caused by artificial light at night are not tied to enjoyment of premises and so will= not be covered. The issue with the loss of the view of the night sky is whether= the loss of a hobby amounts to an unreasonable interference of property rights. Perhaps it might, given that the pursuit of hobbies is important for mental wellbeing, and offers business a market for hobby products. However it is likely that such interference will not be held to cross the threshold.

As a result the nuisance regime is not the right avenu= e to use to adequately regulate artificial light at night. It presents a reactive mechanism and so is unable to prevent lighting problems arising in the first place, (planning would be the opportunity to address these problems). It is also limited in scope. The health test covers only known health problems ba= cked up by a credible body of existing medical evidence, not emerging unsubstantiated claims of possible links to cancer that require further investigation and evidence. It is also limited in that it only protects aga= inst interference in everyday property enjoyment, and again it is not designed to protect against the wider environmental, such as the loss of the night sky = or even the energy waste issues.

The nuisance regime is based on a considerable degree = of subjective judgment on the part of the local authority and judge. Whilst the metrics of the CIE or ILP may be cited in court they will only be persuasiv= e to a judge and not binding. (For example set maxima permitted to enter bedroom windows at night.) The bolt-on nuisance approach offers a mixture of advant= ages and disadvantages. It certainly provides the flexibility to give a just res= ult to a complaint, but at the expense of certainty and transparency. For examp= le, commercial applicants may not know what they can/cannot do. Consumer complainants may fail to bring an action if the outcome is uncertain without metrics, fearing the costs should they lose. Regulators are also faced with financial policy considerations, and will be expected to focus their resour= ces on “core” policy areas. These rather new and untested concepts of nuisanc= e from artificial light are unlikely to be acted on by a local authority unless the negative effects are so serious that they deem it very safe to take a case = to court.

Even though metrics serve as soft guidance only, the UK Institution of Lighting Professionals has produced a guidance note on the reduction of light pollution [35][35]. This includes a table of metrics that may be used for objective guidance in assessing nuisance and lighting levels at planning stage. The table suggests maximum levels for the escape of light that may be deemed acceptable. These figures are a modified form of those given by the international lighting bo= dy, the International Commission on Illumination [20][36]. The guidance breaks areas down into a series of zones, from 0 to 4, with different maximum levels of stray light recommended. (E0 is for a dark sky park, and E4 for a large inner city area.) It also suggests the use of curf= ews, where lighting that is not needed is switched off.

8. Republic of Korea (Metrics= )

The Republic of Korea (South Kore= a) has adopted a dedicated law [36][37] using a variation on the metrics suggested by the CIE [20][38], which it makes binding. Metri= cs can provide objective set limits to the amounts of light that are permitted. Th= is objectivity gives metrics several advantages. Firstly, they are free from t= he uncertainty of that exists under the (subjective) English nuisance law. A level is eith= er permitted or it isn’t, so the rules are very clear and transparent. As such lighting designers, and users of lighting (commercial, public sector or consumer users) as well as enforcement authorities will have a much clearer indication as to what is and is not permitted. Lighting users can confident= ly use lighting within these limits. This avoids the need to commit financial resources on failed legal action. Similarly, enforcement bodies are on much stronger ground when approaching the owners of offending lighting. The clar= ity offer by metrics will avoid authorities having to prioritise and risk finan= cial resources in taking cases to court, so leading to more compliance and less court cases. Consumers suffering from light shining into bedroom windows for example, will also be on a stronger ground to complain if the lighting exce= eds that given in the metrics. However in order to achieve this, the metrics us= ed must be freely available to all (including consumers), otherwise the system would fail to offer all parties equal transparency and access.

A disadvantage of a metrics system comes from its’ great strength in certainty. That is, the certainty lacks flexibility, because a fixed maximum might not reflect the full circumstanc= es because there might be other factors coming into play. For example, there m= ay subjectively be a problem from the combined effect of say light with noise, where the individual levels of both light and noise are in themselves below= the maximum metric. However the perception of their combined effect might cross= the threshold. Similarly, the irritation caused by flashing lighting might be deemed worthy of a lower set maximum. However metrics could offer a solutio= n by devising a rule to compare several metrics, such as the combined effect of = say light and noise.

Metrics may also fail to address = the different effects of human perception caused by the colour of the lighting. Blue rich light for example might provide a greater disturbance than a soft yellow, because it may appear brighter to the human eye. This is where the = bolt on nuisance regime of England has an advantage, in as much as the enforcer = may evaluate the total effect of the lighting, using wider concepts than a fixed set of metrics. As a result, the question is whether the benefit of certain= ty is outweighed by the dis-benefit of a lack of flexibility. It is probably t= rue to say that any metrics system takes an “organic” form, evolving as human= understanding progresses to take on board new understandings of lighting practices, and t= he negative effects that they might have. As such metrics which are reviewed a= nd updated offer a very good opportunity for regulation.

The CIE 150 and Korean systems zo= ne areas into four environmental zones (E zones) ranging from E1 (the darkest), to E4 (the brightest). E1 is reserved for countryside areas, whilst E4 is for commercial city areas requiring the highest levels of lighting. (The E0 zon= e is a UK addition to the CIE metrics.) The zones are determined by the use of l= and under the Korean Law on National Land Planning and Use. The advantage of su= ch a zoning scheme is again transparency to all of the parties affected light at night, business, consumer as well as the regulator.

The Korean law provides a variati= on on the CIE 150 figures for these zones. The table shows compares the CIE 150 and the Korean figures, with the Korean statistics given in parenthesis and bold. The Korean maxima apply from 60 minutes after sunset until 60 minutes before sunrise.

Table 2. A comparison of CIE150 to Korean lighting ordinance values

It= em

Vertic= al illuminance on windows. (Light coming into windows.) (Lumens/m2)

Maximum luminance from illuminated building facades (Candellas/m2)

Maxima= for average surface luminance of illuminated signs (Candellas/m2)<= /span>

E1

2 (10)

   0 (20 with an average of 5)

    50 (50)=

E2

5 (10)

   5 (60 with an average of 5)

   400 (400)

E3

10 (10)

10 (180 with an average of 15)

   800 (800)

E4

25 (25)

25 (300 with an average of 25)

1,000 (1,000)

* Both CIE and Korean statistics are given, with the latter in parenthesis and bold.

The Korean maxima apply from 60 minutes after sunset until 60 minutes before sunrise.

The Korean values are identical to the CIE for illuminated advertising but higher than those under CIE150 for window illuminance (light coming into windows) in the more stringent zones = E1 and 2. The higher levels may be due to the population density of Korea lead= ing to more extraneous light. It may also represent an opportunity to give comm= erce time to adjust to regulation with a fairly easy to meet high maximum, before reducing it at a later date to be in line with CIE 150 values. The Korean levels for the illumination of structures are also higher, but although the= ir maxima are considerably higher, they involve an average that is almost in l= ine with the CIE figures. As such Korean building illumination may be compliant= if the structure contains both brightly lit and unlit (or dimly lit) sections. However the issues caused by light at night, for example light intrusion, m= ight be more a result of the maximum levels of light rather than their average levels. These maxima might permit what might otherwise be considered over-illumination of buildings.

A disadvantage of a zoning policy like this is that like noise, light travels across different lighting zones. This is particularly a problem in densely populated countries, such as many= in Europe and South Korea. Similarly, city areas may contain mixed-use areas containing both commercial and residential buildings, and these areas often have illuminated billboards opposite apartment blocks. However, it is possi= ble that the law could in time also adopt curfews so that illuminated billboards etc must be switched off completely at a given time. This would mean that t= he need to sleep is deemed to outweigh the economic merits for illuminated advertising in the early hours of the morning, (11pm or midnight to 6am perhaps).

It is also important to discuss w= hat these maximum figures actually mean in practice, and the importance in educating all of the parties involved, including the enforcement bodies. The Korean metrics prescribes that there should be no more than 25Lux of light entering a bedroom window in an inner city area in the heart of the commerc= ial district. It might be easy for regulators to assume that a light level of 3= 0Lux is only a little over the 25 limit and so permit it. By comparison, the max= imum light of the Full Moon is less than 0.5Lux. So 5Lux equates to at least 10 = Full Moons, and an average lounge is lit to about 10Lux in the evening. There ha= ve been cases in England where planning authorities have been referred to the (non-binding) metrics in England and made this mistake, passing planning ap= plications where the light levels exceed the metric by 3-5Lux. This clearly raises iss= ues of education, where regulators might take a different decision if they real= ised what the statistics actually meant in practice.

Both the maxima under these objec= tive metrics and the subjective English nuisance laws show the difficulties in balancing the competing interests between the commercial use of lighting and the right to a dark bedroom. To what extent might it be suggested that the victim be responsible for the light levels, and fit blackout curtains at th= eir own cost? It is suggested that it would be wrong to place the cost and burd= en of abatement on the victim. Complainants should never be told to fit thicker curtains where the = real source of the problem is the lighting; if the problem results from the fail= ure to employ best practicable means so as to avoid the nuisance. However location might be an impor= tant factor, as what is seen as reasonable behaviour will vary from the countrys= ide to an inner city area. It is probably unreasonable for a city centre dweller to fit no curtains at all, where even with the use of best practicable means the light levels would disturb the reasonable person without curtains. However, it should always be unreasonable to expect a complainant to pay for blackout curtains that must= be fitted tightly in order to prevent bright light from entering a bedroom win= dow. It has been suggested at an English planning application for cricket ground lighting in a residential area, that the cricket club might offer to pay for blackout curtains, (although no condition was imposed on the applicant). Further this does not take on board the wider use of property that may be affected by lighting. It may put residents off using their gardens; late ev= ening BBQs in summer for instance.

Effective regulation needs effect= ive enforcement powers. The Korean law provides this opportunity. Local authori= ties have enforcement powers to fine and/or impose a compliance order, which offenders must comply with within three months. (This is similar to the Bri= tish statutory nuisance regime as it takes the cost and burden away from the victim.) The fine rises with the severity of the breach of the lighting lev= els, and increases from a first offence through a second, to a third offence, committed within 12 months. The escalation of fines is a good way to ensure compliance. The lowest fine is 50 USD is for a first violation of less than= 1.5 times the lighting standard. It increases to 1,000 USD for a third violatio= n. Whilst the highest fine is reserve= d for violators who fail to obey a compliance order. Here the fine is 2,500 USD f= or the first violation, rising to 10,000 USD for a third. Violators who block = or hinder the assessment of the lighting by the local authority are subject to= a fine of 250 USD for a first violation, rising to 1,000 USD for a third offence.   Such fines sho= uld help to put violators off blocking an investigation, hoping that the local authority will give up, or be called to more serious offence elsewhere. However, it remains to be seen whether local authorities will be able to, or willing to put in the resources to investigate offences with fines of 50 US= D.

Fines may be reduced by up to 50%= if the violation is deemed an error (which risks compliance of the enforcers),= but does offer a partial defence for genuine mistakes. It may also be reduced by 50% where the violators are making reasonable attempts to reduce the offence. However, no fine can= be reduced which the violator has previously failed to pay.

So the objective metrics system w= ith a comprehensive enforcement mechanism, at least on paper, has much to comme= nd it. However the limits of strict maxima that lack flexibility tend to dilute the likely effectiveness of this approach.

9. Conclusion

This paper has attempted to demonstrate that artificial light at night may cause a wide range of interdisciplinary problems for hum= an health, ecology and the natural environment that are sufficiently serious to warrant legal regulation. We have set out the different mechanisms by which this regulation may take place, and compared the subjective bolt-on approach taken in England, with the dedicated (metrics based) law in Korea.

The English regime offers flexibility, in that all criteria may be weighed up, in a way that is most suitable for deciding the case. It may also be well suited to evolve as human understanding of the problems that may be caused by artificial light at night evolves. However, = this bolt on approach is severely limited to cover only the pre-existing criteria for concepts such as nuisance in law. Whilst the problems that light at nig= ht can cause are far broader. Further, the English nuisance approach can only = be effective if the regulators fully understand the problems that lighting may cause, and how they may be abated without compromising the positive benefits that light at night may have. This subjective approach also lacks clarity a= nd certainty. As a result it is often not clear to commerce exactly what light= ing is permitted and what is not. Further, regulators may be far less likely to risk financial resources and time in pursuing lighting cases because of this lack of certainty, instead prioritising more graphic breaches of other regulations. The net result is that a subjective opinion on a poorly a poor= ly understood problem is unlikely to result in action.

The Korean approach uses a dedicated law, and so it is written from the outset to address the broad problems that artificial light= at night may cause. It gets round the lack of clarity and lack of certainty of= the English system by using binding metrics.&n= bsp; Such an objective system offer transparency for business, consumer a= nd regulator. It makes the enforcement system simpler and is far more likely to result in enforcement than the English system. However it lacks the flexibi= lity of the English system. On balance however, it is submitted that a Korean metrics based system has the edge over the English system. If the metrics system is reviewed and updated to reflect current knowledge, and that the l= ight limits represent a fair balance of the competing commercial/consumer intere= sts. Similarly, a metrics system must have a mechanism for taking into account a mixed problem, of say noise and light, which might not breach the lighting metric. A well understood metrics system that is regularly enforced is ultimately better than a more flexible system that is poorly understood and even more poorly enforced.

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Year	Sleep<= o:p>	Life	General glare	Other<= o:p>	Total<= o:p>
2015	1043	73=	59	2<= /p>	1177
2014	1424	136	-	11	1571
2013	547	186	-	40	773

It= em	Vertic= al illuminance on windows. (Light coming into windows.) (Lumens/m2)	Maximum luminance from illuminated building facades (Candellas/m2)	Maxima= for average surface luminance of illuminated signs (Candellas/m2)<= /span>
E1	2 (10)	0 (20 with an average of 5)	50 (50)=
E2	5 (10)	5 (60 with an average of 5)	400 (400)
E3	10 (10)	10 (180 with an average of 15)	800 (800)
E4	25 (25)	25 (300 with an average of 25)	1,000 (1,000)